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CUBA AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A COLD WAR STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba in January 1959 culminating a three-year revolution against President Fulgencio Batista's government. In October 1960, President Dwight D.
Eisenhower initiated the opening phase of economic sanctions against Cuba and in 1961 the United States and Cuba severed diplomatic ties. Every President from Eisenhower to George W. Bush has reviewed and kept in place sanctions against Cuba. The sanctions were originally established in response to Cuba's seizure of U.S. property, (approximately $1.8 billion at the time), its alliance with the former Soviet Union, and Castro's defiance of any American intervention into Cuba. 1 The island nation of Cuba is located just 90 miles south of the United
States, but the long-standing confrontation and sanctions have kept the two nations isolated from one another for over 40 years.
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During the first half of the 20 th century, the United States treated Cuba with little respect, perceiving the island as little more than a territory under its own control. Peter Schwab, noted authority on human rights issues, has argued that in seizing control of the Cuban economy, the U.S. turned Cuba "into a brothel for U.S. tourists." 3 The Monroe Doctrine was the justification used for intervention into Cuba and subsequent occupation and control. Philip Bonsal, former Ambassador to Cuba, has explained that, "Pre-Castro Cuba was a depressed, exploited 'colony' dominated and managed by American 'imperialists' and their Cuban 'lackeys' for selfish profit." withdrew from public office. Considered an able and respected leader, he remained a key influence behind the scenes and backed his own candidate during the 1952 elections. 7 After it became obvious that Batista's candidate was going to lose, he planned a masterful coup and successfully assumed the office of president again. The ease with which Batista took over power highlighted dramatically the weaknesses of Cuban political institutions, and underscored the violence that pervaded Cuban politics. 8 For the first few months nothing changed, but later, Batista's regime became much more repressive and he began killing his political opponents.
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This sowed the seeds for more revolution as certain sectors grew more and more dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. One such dissatisfied citizen was a young lawyer by the name of Fidel Castro Ruz.
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MAINTAIN STATUS QUO
The goal of driving Castro from power failed throughout the Cold war and afterwards.
Analysts have identified three main reasons for the failure of the sanctions to lead to the desired outcome: Cuba was able to circumvent the embargo by developing ties with the Soviet Union;
Castro turned the sanctions into a successful information campaign to rally national support; and the goal of overthrowing Castro by economic sanctions alone proved too difficult to achieve.
Working against unilateral sanctions, Cuba easily bypassed U.S. intentions by developing its ties with the Soviet Union, and developing trade with other states. Since the U.S. was responsible for over 60% of the exports from Cuba, U.S. policymakers assessed that America was the only store in town, and that U.S. sanctions would bring Cuba to her knees. But Cuba turned to the Soviet Union and others; Canada, Japan, Mexico and others never fully complied with the sanctions. According to Donna Kaplowitz, Professor Castro can continue to convince the Cuban people that the U.S. is to blame for all the ills the country is suffering, and it will keep him elevated as a leader who has stood against the U.S. By maintaining the status quo, the U.S. eliminates its ability to take the lead and develop the economic conditions on U.S. terms. By maintaining our current course, we allow other countries to take advantage and leverage this advantage to develop ties that could thwart U.S.
goals. China and Russia certainly have the motive and the means to undercut the U.S. in this area. The U.S. has been accused of maintaining double standards with our policies toward Cuba. The current demands required for Cuba to meet in order to reverse the sanctions revolve around human rights, free elections, free trade and a democratic society. But the U.S. has dealt with Vietnam, China, North Korea, Indonesia and even Russia when these countries did not completely meet all the criteria we were demanding from Castro. From 1966-1998 the U.S. Intelligence Agency did not even mention Cuba.
LIMITED ENGAGEMENT (PARTIAL LIFT OF SANCTIONS)
In contrast to maintaining the status quo, this course of action would demonstrate to the world U.S. willingness to facilitate better relations and bring Cuba into the Western Hemisphere mainstream, and it would go a long way toward improving U.S. credibility within the UN. In 1993 the UN voted 88-4 condemning the embargo, and the last vote was 167-3 against. The U.S. is the only country imposing any sanctions against Cuba.
To begin lifting sanctions in a piecemeal fashion over extended periods will reap similar results as maintaining the status quo. Castro has clearly demonstrated his unwillingness to discuss any overtures by the U.S. to bring about any substantive changes and normalizing relations with the U.S.; nor is he willing to meet any of the demands for lifting the sanctions. It is clear by his speeches and interviews, Castro is deeply committed today as he was in 1959 to keeping Cuba free of any and all "imperialistic" intervention. In an interview conducted in 1994
Castro reiterated the conditions necessary for the normalization of ties with the United States:
First of all, for the blockade to end………….Second, for the United States to resign itself to the fact that Cuba is an independent, sovereign country. Third, respect our people's right to choose the political, social, and economic system they believe most fair. Castro's hold on power would be threatened and he stands to potentially lose any hold on Cuba and the rhetorical and psychological power of his stance as a "David" against the U.S. The sanctions the United States enforces against the Castro regime are not just a policy tool, but a moral statement. It is wrong to prop up a regime that routinely stifles all the freedoms that make us human. The United States stands opposed to such tyranny and will oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against the Castro regime until it respects the basic human rights of its citizens, frees political prisoners, holds democratic free elections, and allows free speech.
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Eliminating sanctions completely would not by any means guarantee democracy or human rights improvements in Cuba, but it can certainly be stated that these sanctions over the past half century have failed to accomplish the same. Nor can we expect that by tightening the sanctions we achieve anything other than an increase in the suffering of the Cuban population.
In contrast, we have offered assistance to other countries under similar conditions. Nixon did it Even though polls show that CANF is not the majority voice among Cuban-Americans and does not represent American domestic views as a whole, it is nonetheless a powerful lobby that keeps government focus on the issues even when mainstream American does not. 43 To argue a soft position toward Castro could lead to being labeled a communist sympathizer. This argument would be hard to counter since a communist is still in power. Politicians could risk a great deal when they bring forth discussions about a change in attitude and policy toward
Castro. This is a policy failure and one that requires a radically different approach. We continue to break the information embargo that the Cuban government has imposed on its people for a half a century. Repressive governments fear the truth, and so we're increasing the amount and expanding the distribution of printed material to Cuba, of internet-based information inside of Cuba, and of AM-FM and short wave radios for Cubans. We know that the enemy of every tyrant is the truth. We're determined to bring the truth to the people who suffer under Fidel Castro 45 Both Cuba and the U.S. have a great deal to gain by tearing down the barriers to normalized relations. There would be some political risk. CANF is not among the majority, although a powerful lobby that could influence voters, and staunch supporters of the embargo in Congress would use this as leverage to give the administration a black-eye. But the political risk would be minimal compared to the economic, diplomatic, and global gains. As James Glassman, a Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, writes, "If Americans truly believe in economic freedom, how can we perpetuate a policy that not only flouts that principle but which hasn't worked anyway? How can the U.S. say that capitalism and free trade are worthy goals, yet every day limit Cubans' ability to participate in such activity?"
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CONCLUSION
The 43 year stand-off between the U.S. and Cuba has not been a success for either side.
The sanctions have failed to accomplish any of the stated objectives for the U.S., and the Cuban people have suffered poor living conditions and a repressive government. To continue the current policy is futile and it appears that for the near term, the U.S. is content on waiting for
Castro to die. The struggle of wills has favored Castro and only by lifting the sanctions will we be able to completely disarm his ability to wage any type of information operations against the U.S. and to keep his revolution alive. We cannot expect these sanctions to increase the economic conditions to any point where Castro would step down, nor can we expect the Cuban people to finally rise up and revolt to establish a democratic form of government. Our policy should begin to focus on restoring better living conditions and a quality of life to the Cuban 
